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ROVING BORDER SEARCHES FOR ILLEGAL
ALIENS: AVOIDING THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
Each year hundreds of thousands of illegal aliens enter the
United States without detection. In 1972, Immigration and
Naturalization officials were able to locate 398,000 such aliens
within our nation's borders.' In the same year, the number of
illegal aliens living in the United States was conservatively
estimated by the Justice Department at over one million. Al-
though this overwhelming alien infiltration is a problem faced
at each of our international borders, the greatest influx is from
Mexico. Approximately eighty-five percent of our current ille-
gal alien residents are Mexicans.2
The primary reason for the huge Mexican exodus is dispar-
ity in wages between the United States and Mexico. In the
cities of Mexicali and Tijuana the average daily wage is $3.40,
and wages are substantially lower in the interior of Mexico. The
average yearly income of the poorest forty percent of Mexicans,
those most likely to flee to the United States, is less than $150
per year.3
The illegal alien intrusion has experienced no abatement.
In fact, the illegal ingress is growing at a rate of twenty percent
a year.4 The number of illegal Mexicans is most apparent in
California, where in 1971 with California's unemployment rate
at 7.4 percent of its labor force, there were between 200,000 and
300,000 illegal aliens earning a total of one hundred million
dollars per year in wages. 5
While the alien problem constitutes a crushing burden upon
the population of the southwestern states, the dilemma has
also reached crisis proportions in other parts of the nation. In
1. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 294 (1973).
2. United States v. Baca, 368 F. Supp. 398, 402 (S.D. Cal. 1973). In 1974, 94 percent
of the deportable aliens arrested were from Mexico. See INS ANN. REP. 94 (1974), cited
in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 879 (1975) n. 5.
3. See generally, appendix to United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 900 (1975).
Unfortunately, Mexican employment statistics are unlikely to improve since 45 per-
cent of Mexico's population is under 15 years of age and thus soon ready to enter the
labor market.
4. For a further discussion of the growing alien problem, see Note, Border Searches
Revisited: The Constitutional Propriety of Fixed and Temporary Checkpoint Searches,
2 HASTINGS CONsT. L. Q. 251 (1975).
5. Hearings on Illegal Aliens Before Subcomm. No. 1 of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 150 (1971), cited in appendix to United States
v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. at 903 (1975).
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Chicago, for example, there are at least 75,000 illegal Mexican
residents.' Currently, the Immigration and Naturalization
Service estimates that there are as many as ten or twelve mil-
lion aliens illegally in the country.'
The reasons for the increased concern over illegal aliens
stem not only from the recent upsurge in their number, but also
because of their effect upon the already depressed job market
in the United States. This disastrous effect has been com-
pounded because most of the illegal Mexican aliens constitute
unskilled labor, and thus are in competition with the already
hard-hit minority group work force.
Enforcement of immigration laws is frustrated by an
extensive border and inadequate manpower. In addition,
search and seizure is a key element of the enforcement effort.
Although the exclusionary rule may be applied in a variety of
contexts," this article will deal solely with its application in
search and seizure cases involving roving United States Border
Patrols acting in the capacity of customs and immigration offi-
cials.
I. ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS
Prior to 1973,1 customs searches and immigration searches
did not receive identical treatment in the courts. The authority
of customs officials to search persons seeking entrance into the
United States with or without a warrant or probable cause was
established in 1789.10 Comparable authority of immigration of-
ficials was not recognized until 1875.11 While the law seems to
6. TIME, Oct. 15, 1973, at 29.
7. INS ANN. REP. iii (1974), cited in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873,
878 (1975). Congress has attempted to limit entry into this country. 8 U.S.C. § 1151(a)
(1970) states that with the limited exception of immediate relatives of United States
citizens, the number of lawful immigrants shall not exceed a total of 170,000 in any
fiscal year.
8. The exclusionary rule is enforced as against four major types of constitutional
violations in both state and federal criminal proceedings: searches and seizures
violating the fourth amendment; confessions obtained in violation of the fifth and sixth
amendments; identification testimony obtained in violation of these same amend-
ments; and evidence which is obtained by methods so shocking that its admission
would violate the due process clause. Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search
and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REv. 665, 666 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Oaks].
9. The decision in Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973) changed
the requirements in this area.
10. Act of July 3, 1789, ch. 5 § 24, 1 Stat. 29, 43.
11. Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 141, § 5, 18 Stat. 477. This statutory approval has
evolved into 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(3) (1970), to be discussed infra.
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be in a quagmire with respect to warrant and probable cause
requirements in extended border searches, it is presumed that
searches at the border or its functional equivalent 2 are excep-
tions to the requirements of warrant or probable cause:
Although the Fourth Amendment generally requires both a
showing of probable cause and a warrant from a neutral mag-
istrate before a search may be judged reasonable, border
searches are well recognized exceptions to these require-
ments. Whether conducted along the border or at its
functional equivalent, neither a warrant need be secured nor
probable cause shown in searches for illegal aliens or
merchandise. ,3
It is worth noting, however, that even though searches at
the border or its functional equivalent do not require warrant
or probable cause, they are still required to be "reasonable."' 4
12. Although there is some disagreement as to what constitutes the proper "border
area," it is generally conceded that such border searches are not limited to the actual
checkpoint station at an international boundary. Depending upon the circumstances,
fixed checkpoint searches away from the border can be considered "functional equiva-
lents" of regular border searches. 6 A.L.R. Fed. 317, § 4(a). The Supreme Court, in
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973) included as "functional equiva-
lents" searches at established stations near the border, e.g., at the confluence of two
roads which extend from the border, or initial points of entry into the United States
such as airports handling non-stop international flights. See also Note, Border
Searches Revisited: The Constitutional Propriety of Fixed and Temporary Checkpoint
Searches, 2 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 251 (1975).
In King v. United States, 348 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 926
(1965), it was held that border searches could take place at points geographically
removed from the border so long as there was apparent "change of condition" of the
vehicle or person subsequently searched after its entry into the country. The King rule
was applied in Alexander v. United States, 362 F.2d 379 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied
385 U.S. 977 (1966), where customs officers acted upon a tip from an informant and
placed defendant's vehicle under surveillance as it crossed the border, and followed it
into the city of Nogales where it was finally stopped and searched. Heroin was found.
The court held that such a search was actually a "border search" because the vehicle
had been in almost constant view of government officials - thus no probable cause or
warrant was required. See generally Note, Fourth Amendment Applications to
Searches Conducted by Immigration Officers, 38 ALBANY L. REV. 962 (1974).
13. Sutis, The Extent of the Border, 1 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 235, 236 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Sutis]. That is, the law makes no distinction between customs
and immigration searches which take place at the border - both are subject to rela-
tively little restraint. Immigration searches at the border are authorized by 8 U.S.C. §
1225(a), which states:
Immigration officers are authorized and empowered to board and search any
vessel, aircraft, railway car, or other conveyance, or vehicle in which they believe
aliens are being brought into the United States.
14. 6 A.L.R. Fed. 317, § 2.
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Despite the firm-establishment of search and seizure power at
the border, the real problem exists when such searches take
place at points removed from the border, whether they are
random roving Border Patrol searches or fixed checkpoint
searches. The authority of customs officials to search vehicles
at locations removed from the border was established in 1789,' 5
whereas the comparable immigration power was not recognized
until 1946.16 The question of whether these extended border
searches require a warrant or probable cause has been the sub-
ject of much controversy recently in the Supreme Court.
II. CUSTOMS V. IMMIGRATION SEARCHES
The current dilemma which faces the Supreme Court is a
result of historically conflicting standards for immigration and
customs searches. Generally, immigration officers have been
subjected to less rigid standards.
The case law governing customs searches beyond the border
requires that customs officers have "probable cause" or "rea-
sonable certainty" in order to search a vehicle. The Fifth and
Ninth Circuits, where most of the case law occurs, demand that
customs officers have such "reasonable certainty" that the ve-
hicle in question had contraband in it when it crossed the bor-
der or that it was placed in the vehicle after it crossed the
border.' 7
While customs searches are directed toward merchandise,
immigration searches deal primarily with stopping illegal al-
iens from entering the country. According to statute, immigra-
tion officers are authorized to search any vehicle within a "rea-
sonable distance" from the border. 8 Such distance has been set
15. 1 Stat. 29, 43.
16. Act of August 7, 1946, ch. 768, 60 Stat. 865. Immigration officials were given
the power to search vehicles within a "reasonable distance" of the border.
17. United States v. Weil, 432 F.2d 1320 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 947
(1971). For an analysis of recent case law in the field, see Note, In Search of the Border:
Searches Conducted by Federal Customs and Immigration Officers, 5 J. oF INT'L L.
AND POL. 93 (1972).
18. The government's authority to conduct such relatively unfettered immigration
searches is predicated upon 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(3) (1970), which states:
(a) Any officer or employee of the Service authorized under regulations
prescribed by the Attorney General shall have power without warrant -
(3) within a reasonable distance from any external boundary of the
United States, to board and search for aliens any vessel within the terri-
torial waters of the United States and any railway car, aircraft, convey-
ance, or vehicle, and within a distance of twenty-five miles from any such
1976]
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by the Attorney General as within one hundred miles of the
international border. " Prior to Almeida-Sanchez v. United
States,2" immigration officials were generally permitted to con-
duct roving border searches at random and without warrant or
probable cause. There existed a "general suspicion" of all vehi-
cles traveling on public highways leading away from the bor-
der, and immigration officials needed no specific reason to stop
and search a vehicle for an illegal entrant.2
These unequal standards created havoc for the courts be-
cause customs officials routinely disguised their contraband
searches as immigration searches, thus circumventing the
probable cause requirements in customs searches. This was
caused by the fact that Border Patrol agents often act in a dual
capacity as both customs and immigration agents,22 and are
often able to protect seized contraband from the devastating
effect of the exclusionary rule even though they had no warrant
or probable cause. While conducting a legal immigration
search on less than probable cause, the Border Patrol agent
would simply seize any contraband found as the fruit of a valid
search.
This rather deceitful procedure evidences the impractical-
ity of trying to maintain different standards for customs and
immigration searches. In United States v. McDaniels,3 the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals admitted evidence of contra-
band seized by customs officers on a so-called immigration
search. The court rather jocularly described such procedure:
It appears that Border Patrol agents wear two hats, one as an
immigration officer and the other as a customs officer. The
agents testified that they had planned to wear their immigra-
tion hats that night, but we find nothing in the statutes that
external boundary to have access to private lands, but not dwellings, for
the purpose of patrolling the border to prevent the illegal entry of aliens
into the United States; ...
19. 8 C.F.R. § 287.1 (1973).
20. 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
21. Note, In Search of the Border: Searches Conducted by Federal Customs and
Immigration Officers, 5 J. OF INT'L L. AND POL. 93, 104 (1970).
22. United States v. Hortze, 179 F. Supp. 913 (S.D. Cal. 1959); Duprez v. United
States, 435 F.2d 1276 (9th Cir. 1970).
23. 463 F.2d 129 (5th Cir. 1972). See also United States v. DeLeon, 462 F.2d 170
(5th Cir. 1972).
24. 463 F.2d at 134.
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would preclude them from later donning their customs hats
during a proper border search. [Emphasis added.]2
The use of such tactics by Border Patrol officials certainly in
itself necessitated a reexamination of probable cause require-
ments for immigration searches.
The underlying reason why the Court has been reluctant to
tighten the reins on immigration searches was a fear that the
exclusionary rule would thereupon make any attempt to con-
trol the illegal Mexican influx nearly futile. The exclusionary
rule's inescapable effect has made the rule's continued efficacy
in such searches questionable.
Ill. VITALITY OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
A. Adoption
On the federal level, the Court first suggested in Boyd v.
United States15 that the best method of protecting the public's
fourth amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches
and seizures would be to exclude illegally obtained evidence
and thus hopefully deter law enforcement officials from over-
stepping their constitutional confines. One authority2 has
stated that two types of justifications existed for the exclusion-
ary rule, one normative and one factual. The normative justifi-
cation is the evil of government participation in illegal conduct.
The factual justification lies in the contention that by exclud-
ing illegally obtained evidence, a reduction in search and sei-
zure violations will necessarily follow.Y The exclusionary rule
became substantive federal law in 1914 and was finally ex-
tended to the states in 1961.25
The decision in Elkins v. United States29 stressed that the
exclusionary rule was not designed as an affirmative remedy for
citizens deprived of their fourth amendment rights, but rather
only as a means of promoting respect for such rights by those
who enforce them:
25. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
26. Oaks, supra note 8.
27. Id. at 668.
28. In Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), the exclusionary rule was
declared federal law. In Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), the rule was expressly
mandated as applicable to state courts as well, although it had already been widely
accepted as such.
29. 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
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[Tihe rule is calculated to prevent, not repair. Its purpose
is to deter - to compel respect for the constitutional guar-
anty in the only effective available way - by removing the
incentive to disregrard it. '
Since its adoption, the actual effectiveness of the rule's de-
terrent purpose has been dubious, at the very least." Some
critics comment that instead of curbing unlawful searches and
seizures, the rule's principal result has been the creation of a
shield for the guilty. In sum, the Court decided that the exclu-
sionary rule was the best means of protecting constitutional
guarantees, although it often releases known criminals due to
the exclusion of decisively relevant evidence.
B. Current Standing
Recently, the exclusionary rule has suffered a barrage of
assaults by the courts. Courts have become increasingly hesi-
tant to extend the rule's application. In United States v.
Calandra,2 the Court refused to apply the exclusionary rule in
grand jury proceedings. The Court stated:
Despite its broad deterrent purpose, the exclusionary rule has
never been interpreted to proscribe the use of illegally seized
evidence in all proceedings or against all persons. As with any
remedial device, the application of the rule has been re-
stricted to those areas where its remedial objectives are
thought most efficaciously served23
The Calandra Court proceeded to point out that the exclusion-
ary rule offers little protection for many citizens because in
order to have standing to invoke the rule, the unlawful search
victim must show threatened incrimination by the govern-
ment. 4 If the government does not threaten incrimination, the
victim has no affirmative rights under the rule.
In Michigan v. Tucker,31 the Court stressed that since the
only purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter unlawful
30. Id. at 217.
31. For a pointed criticism and statistical analysis of the exclusionary rule's deter-
rent effect, see Oaks, supra note 8. See also Horowitz, Excluding the Exclusionary Rule
- Can There Be An Effective Alternative?, 47 L.A. BAR BULL. 91 (1972).
32. 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
33. Id. at 348.
34. Id.
35. 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
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searches, the rule loses its purpose if the search was conducted
in good faith by government law enforcers:
The deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule necessarily
assumes that the police have engaged in a willful, or at the
very least, negligent conduct which has deprived the defen-
dant of some right. . . . Where the official action was pur-
sued in complete good faith, however, the deterrence ration-
ale loses much of its force26
The exclusionary rule's shortcomings became quite appar-
ent when the Court, in Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 3
decided to require probable cause for immigration searches.
IV. THE ALMEIDA-SANCHEZ BREAK
The dispute over probable cause for roving border searches
in immigration cases peaked in the Almeida-Sanchez case. In
a five-to-four decision, the Court chose to tighten the standards
for such searches, thereby broadening the effect of the exclu-
sionary rule. Almeida-Sanchez was a Mexican citizen holding
a valid United States work permit. A roving Border Patrol
officer stopped the defendant's automobile on a California
highway twenty-five miles north of the Mexican border. The
east-west highway did not intersect with the border. The Bor-
der Patrol conceded it had neither a search warrant nor prob-
able cause38 when the vehicle was stopped while conducting an
alleged immigration search, 9 the officers proceeded to search
for aliens underneath and behind the rear seat, but found in-
stead a cache of marijuana. The evidence became the basis of
a conviction for a federal crime.4"
The government cited 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(3), 11 which sim-'
ply authorizes external boundary searches within a "reasonable
distance" from the international border, in support of the rov-
ing border search. As noted earlier, 2 such distance has been
interpreted as within one hundred air miles of the border. The
36. Id. at 447.
37. 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
38. Id. at 268.
39. The government argued that such search was under the authority of 8 U.S.C.
§ 1357(a)(3) (1970). For the text of the statute, see note 19.
40. That is, an express violation of 21 U.S.C. § 1760 (1971).
41. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(3) (1970).
42. 8 C.F.R. § 287.1 (1973).
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lower court held that this statute authorized immigration au-
thorities to conduct such inland searches without warrant or
probable cause.
A second argument of the government was that such roving
searches are analogous to administrative inspections discussed
in Camara v. Municipal Court.4 3 In Camara, the Court held
that administrative inspections to enforce community health
and welfare regulations could be made on less than probable
cause. The Court, however, did require that prior to inspection
the inspector must obtain either consent or a warrant sup-
ported by particular physical and demographic characteristics
of the areas to be searched.4
In reversing the lower court's decision to admit the contra-
band into evidence, the Supreme Court in Almeida-Sanchez
refused to accept either argument by the government. The ma-
jority held that the search in question was unreasonable under
the fourth amendment, and thus inadmissible under the exclu-
sionary rule. The Almeida-Sanchez Court said that even
though warrantless automobile searches have been upheld in
the past,4 5 it does not necessarily follow that probable cause
need not exist:
[Blut the Carroll doctrine does not declare a field day for the
police in searching automobiles. Automobile or no automo-
bile, there must be probable cause for the search."
The Court held that simply because the statute in question
does not explicitly call for probable cause, it does not necessar-
ily follow that it may be disregarded.
Secondly, the Court failed to accept the validity of the anal-
ogy between roving Border Patrol searches and administrative
inspections under Camara. The majority decision found these
cases inapposite because even though administrative searches
could be initiated on less than probable cause, a warrant was
still required. The Court found unacceptable an unfettered dis-
cretion for immigration officials at the border.
The search [of the Border Patrol] thus embodied precisely
the evil the Court saw in Camara when it insisted that the
43. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
44. Id. at 537-38.
45. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1924).
46. 413 U.S. at 269.
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"discretion of the official in the field" be circumscribed by
obtaining a warrant prior to inspection. 7
Unfortunately, the majority opinion makes little effort to
appreciate the magnitude of this country's illegal alien influx
problem. The court comments that it is not enough for the
government to argue the seriousness of the illegal alien prob-
lem."' Granted, the Court should not assume the legislative
function, but it might have suggested an alternative procedure.
Rather, the Court rests upon the premise that the fourth
amendment rights of citizens must be protected. One authority
comments:
[C]onsonant with the rule that the Court will hold as nar-
rowly as possible undr th facts presented to it, the Court
glosses over the larger problem in Almeida-Sanchez. The
opinion fails to offer any useful solution to the problem of
aliens illegally entering the country at innumerable points
along the border where the government is tactically unable
to police their entry. The opinion ignores the possibility of
alternative schema for such utilization of the Border Patrol
that would satisfy the requirements of the Fourth Amend-
ment and still provide a practical means for effectively cur-
tailing the illegal entry of aliens into the country. The Court
offers no substitute after dramatically curtailing the useful-
ness of the Border Patrol by severely restricting its area of
operation. The effect, then, is a void in the ability of the
federal government to prevent illegal entry of aliens. 9
Although favoring the exclusion of the contraband in light
of the facts in Almeida-Sanchez, Justice Powell in his concurr-
ence suggested a method by which the repugnant effect of the
exclusionary rule may be avoided. Justice Powell contended
that an equivalent of probable cause already exists in most of
these roving border searches." He states that an examination
of the circumstances surrounding such immigration searches
forms a basis for probable cause.
The conjunction of these factors - consistent judicial ap-
proval, absence of a reasonable alternative for the solution of
a serious problem, and only a modest intrusion on those
47. Id. at 270.
48. 413 U.S. at 273-74.
49. Sutis, supra note 13 at 240.
50. 413 U.S. at 279.
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whose automobiles are searched - persuades me that under
appropriate limited circumstances there may exist a consti-
tutionally adequate equivalent of probable cause to conduct
roving vehicular searches in border areas."'
While Justice Powell might require a lesser showing of prob-
able cause, he does not believe that such searches are an excep-
tion to the warrant requirement. He refused to accept the ma-
jority's interpretation of Carroll v. United States'13 as calling for
no warrant in these searches. He noted that the justification for
a warrantless search was the ability of an automobile to quickly
leave the court's jurisdiction, and that even though Carroll
allowed warrantless searches, it required probable cause in the
sense of specific knowledge about a particular automobile.13
This is a rigid type of probable cause and not the kind that
exists in random roving border searches. Thus, Justice Powell
believed that most roving border searches do not constitute an
exception to the warrant requirement.
While . . . my view is that on appropriate facts the Govern-
ment can satisfy the probable cause requirement for a roving
search in a border area without possessing information about
particular automobiles, it does not follow that the warrant
requirement is inapposite. The very fact that the Govern-
ment's supporting information relates to criminal activity in
certain areas rather than to evidence about a particular auto-
mobile renders irrelevant the justification for warrantless
searches relied upon in Carroll and its progeny. [Emphasis
added.] 4
51. Id. These three criteria were adopted from the decision in Camara v. Municipal
Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967). In Camara, which involved searches for housing code
violations, the Court held that a warrant may be issued even if there is no probable
cause for believing that the particular building contained code violations, so long as
general characteristics, including the nature of the building and of the area indicate
that violations may exist.
Thus, what Justice Powell suggests is that the equivalent of probable cause is
actually less than probable cause in the traditional sense. Justice Powell contends,
however, that it is constitutionally sufficient. See dissent in Almeida-Sanchez v.
United States, 413 U.S. at 288-89, for an analysis of Justice Powell's alternative. For
a detailed criticism of Justice Powell's proposal, see Note, Area Search Warrants in
Border Zones, 84 YALE L.J. 355 (1974). The author argues that an application of the
three criteria does not achieve probable cause.
52. 267 U.S. 132 (1924).
53. 413 U.S. at 281. For a discussion of Carroll and warrantless automobile searches
in general, see also Note, Warrantless Searches & Seizures of Automobiles, 87 HARV.
L. REv. 835 (1973).
54. 413 U.S. at 281-82.
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Thus, he maintained that even though probable cause
might exist in such roving border searches, a warrant was still
required unless the probable cause was directed at the particu-
lar automobile in question. Since the immigration officers in
Almeida-Sanchez had not obtained a warrant, Justice Powell
concurred with the exclusion of the seized evidence.
An alternative is suggested by Justice Powell to help immi-
gration officials avoid the effect of the exclusionary rule. Since
he believed that a search warrant is mandatory for most roving
Border Patrol searches, he suggested the use of an "area-wide
warrant." Such area-wide warrants constitute "advance judi-
cial approval of the decision to conduct roving searches on a
particular road or roads for a reasonable period of time."55 Such
a procedure would allow roving border searches if certain mini-
mal area conditions existed. The use of such area-wide war-
rants would facilitate the needs of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service, and at the same time provide some
judicial control over the arbitrary actions of border agents."
Seemingly, the only possible danger in Justice Powell's alterna-
tive could come from imprudent judges who would simply act
as a rubber stamp in the insuance of such area warrants.5 7
Justice White's dissent in Almeida-Sanchez fails, as does
the majority opinion, to suggest a workable solution which pro-
tects both immigration and fourth dmendment interests. The
only limitation which the dissent would impose upon the immi-
55. Id. at 283. Justice Powell also adopted the use of such "area warrants" from
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), which used such procedure in the
context of administrative searches for housing code violations.
56. The Supreme Court, 1972 Term, 87 HARv. L. REV. 57, 201 (1973). Contra, Note,
Area Search Warrants in Border Zones: Almeida-Sanchez and Camara, 84 YALE L.J.
355, 369 (1974), which states:
Camara's standards for administrative inspections may not properly be applied
to the roving alien search in Almeida-Sanchez. Using area search warrants in
the context of these INS searches would expand Camara. There is good reason
for seeking to limit rather than to extend the application of Camara.
See also, Note, Border Searches: Beyond Almeida-Sanchez, 8 U. CALIF. DAvis L. REV.
163, 182 (1975), which states that unlike administrative searches in Camara, immigra-
tion searches often result in criminal prosecutions. Thus, immigration officials should
at least be held to the degree of reasonable suspicion required in Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1 (1968).
57. Sutis, supra note 14, at 250. The author applauded Justice Powell's alternative
procedure as "a workable means for the apprehension of illegal aliens that would not
significantly interfere with those individual rights of privacy that are so central to the
concept of liberty."
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gration officers is in the extent of their search.58 The only real
check upon such searches would be under a vague "reasonable-
ness" test under the fourth amendment."9 The dissent's asser-
tion of almost unlimited immigration search power within one
hundred miles of the border encroaches upon fourth
amendment rights to nearly as great an extent as the majority
opinion interferes with our national immigration policy.
In hindsight, the split caused by the Almeida-Sanchez
decision can be seen as signaling the future abrogation of its
rather harsh precedent. The Court's 1974-75 Term was respon-
sible for four decisions " which leave the vitality of Almeida-
Sanchez in doubt.
V. THE POST ALMEIDA-SANCHEZ COURT
In United States v. Peltier,"1 the first in a series of roving
border patrol search cases, the Court avoided a direct confron-
tation with the Almeida-Sanchez rule by relying upon the re-
troactivity argument. The Court held that Almeida-Sanchez
would not be applied retroactively (the Peltier search occurred
before the Almeida-Sanchez decision) because its new consti-
tutional doctrine did not greatly aid in the "truth-finding func-
tion." The Court said that unless a new constitutional doctrine
related to fact-finding, it should only be accorded prospective
application.2 The Court stated that since the officers had acted
58. Generally, the scope of a valid search is governed by the grounds of reasonable-
ness under the fourth amendment. Historically, the courts have felt that searches for
illegal aliens should not be as intrusive as searches for contraband because of stricter
probable cause requirements for customs agents. It was held in Barba-Reyes v. United
States, 387 F.2d 91 (9th Cir. 1967), that an immigration officer is authorized to search
any vehicle compartment (e.g., a trunk) in which aliens might hide. Numerous cases
have held that such officers may not search compartments where no alien could hide.
See Valenzuela-Garcia v. United States, 425 F.2d 1170 (9th Cir. 1970), where search
of six-inch space behind trunk panel was invalidated; Roa-Rodriguez v. United States,
410 F.2d 1206 (10th Cir. 1969), which struck down search of jacket; United States v.
Hortze, 179 F. Supp. 913 (S.D. Cal. 1959), which held search of cigarette package was
invalid.
59. 413 U.S. at 297.
60. The four recent decisions concerning such immigrations searches include:
United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975); Bowen v. United States, 422 U.S. 916
(1975); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975); United States v. Ortiz,
422 U.S. 891 (1975).
61. 422 U.S. 531 (1975). The facts in Peltier parallel those in Almeida-Sanchez in
that the defendant Peltier was stopped by a roving Border Patrol on an immigration
search near the Mexican border. Immigration agents had no probable cause in the
traditional sense.
62. Id. at 535.
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in good faith under the law existing prior to Almeida-Sanchez,
it would be unfair to apply that decision retroactively:
The teaching of these retrdactivity cases is that if the law
enforcement officers reasonably believed in good faith that
evidence they had seized was admissible at trial, the "imper-
ative of judicial integrity" is not offended by the introduction
into evidence of that material even if decisions subsequent to
the search or seizure have broadened the exclusionary rule to
encompass evidence seized in that manner."3
The Peltier dissent cautioned that even though the majority
opinion did not actually overrule Almeida-Sanchez, it certainly
did signal the deterioration of that decision's strict probable
cause requirements.
But. . . I have no confidence that the new formulation is to
be confined to putative retroactivity cases. Rather, I suspect
that when a suitable opportunity arises, today's revision of
the exclusionary rule will be pronounced applicable to all
search and seizure cases. 4
The decision in United States v. Brignoni-Poncel5 repre-
sents a further departure from the Almeida-Sanchez ruling,
and to date probably the most workable solution to the roving
border search problem. In Brignoni-Ponce, the defendant's
automobile was stopped by a roving Border Patrol near San
Clemente, California. The only justification offered by the
immigration officers for the vehicle stop was that the vehicle's
occupants appeared to be of Mexican descent." After
63. Id. at 537. The Peltier Court relied upon the handling of a similar retroactivity
issue in Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 636-37 (1965), where the Court refused to
apply the exclusionary rule promulgated in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 343 (1961) retroac-
tively:
Mapp had as its prime purpose the enforcement of the Fourth Amendment
through the inclusion of the exclusionary rule within its rights. This, it was
found, was the only effective deterrent to lawless police action .... We cannot
say that this purpose would be advanced by making the rule retrospective. The
misconduct of the police prior to Mapp has already occurred and will not be
corrected by releasing the prisoners involved.
64. 422 U.S. 531, 551-52 (1975). The handling of the retroactivity issue by the
Peltier majority has come under heavy criticism from other sources as well. Most
commonly it is seen as merely a weak means of avoiding enforcement of Almeida-
Sanchez. See generally Note, Retroactivity - Application of the "New Rule" Thresh-
old Test Before Determining the Retroactivity of Almeida-Sanchez, 53 TEXAS L. REV.
586 (1974).
65. 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
66. Id. at 875.
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questioning the occupants, the officers arrested them as illegal
aliens. The Court ultimately refused to admit the evidence of
the illegal status of the passengers, 7 but did formulate a new
procedure of critical importance to border searches.
First, the Brignoni-Ponce Court distinguished between
"limited stop" of an investigative nature by immigration offi-
cials and the more intrusive, full-scale search of a vehicle.68 In
the former type of situation, the investigating officer may, if he
has reasonable suspicion, question the occupants about their
citizenship and immigration status and also have them explain
any suspicious circumstances. However, in order to further de-
tain the vehicle the officer must either obtain the consent of the
occupants or have probable cause.69 The real success of such a
procedure is evidenced by the fact that the officer will not be
allowed to conduct a full-scale search unless information
gained on such a limited investigatory stop supplies the officer
with probable cause. This safeguard allows for the protection
of innocent highway users from the humiliation of a full-scale
search, while at the same time freeing the hands of immigra-
tion officers to detect those illegal aliens who would hide
behind fourth amendment guarantees.
The Court stated that the "reasonable suspicion" to ini-
tially stop a vehicle can be gained from specific articulable
facts, together with inferences from those facts which
reasonably warrant suspicion that the vehicles contain aliens
who may be illegally in the country. 0 The Court stated that in
all situations, the reasonableness of such suspicion will be as-
sessed in light of the officer's experience in detecting illegal
entry. Factors which may be considered include the character-
istics of the area in which the officer encounters the vehicle, its
proximity to the border, and the usual patterns of traffic on the
67. Id. at 886-87. In applying the Court's new test to the facts in this case, it was
held that the evidence of the illegal status was a "fruit" of an illegal search.
68. Id. at 879-80.
69. Id. at 880. The Court refused to allow immigration officials unfettered discre-
tion in their searches, as had been the case prior to Almeida-Sanchez. The Brignoni-
Ponce Court justified its position by stating:
To approve roving-patrol stops of all vehicles in the border area, without any
suspicion that a particular vehicle is carrying illegal immigrants, would subject
the residents of these and other areas to potentially unlimited interference with
their use of the highways, solely at the discretion of Border Patrol officials.
422 U.S. at 882.
70. 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968), cited in 422 U.S. at 880.
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road. 7' Also, previous experience with alien traffic can supply
the requisite suspicion for such a limited stop, including the
driver's behavior, such as erratic driving or attempts to evade
officers, suspicious aspects of the vehicle such as large hidden
compartments in certain station wagons, or vehicles which
appear to be heavily loaded or have an extraordinary number
of passengers. 72 Mode of dress and haircut are also relevant in
arriving at such "reasonable suspicion. 13 The Brignoni-Ponce
Court refused to admit the evidence of illegal alien status,
holding that the fact of Mexican ancestry by itself was insuffi-
cient to supply the officers with such "reasonable suspicion."
The reason for this relaxation of probable cause for immi-
gration investigatory stops was a recognition by the Court of
the important governmental interest at stake and the minimal
nature of such an intrusion upon the public. Justice Powell, in
writing for the majority, concluded that the intrusion caused
by such investigative stops was at best modest, since all that
need be produced by the suspect was a document showing that
he has a right to be within the United States.74
The Court adopted this two-step investigatory procedure
(i.e., stop and seatch) by analogy from Terry v. Ohio,75 where
it was held that a "pat-down" search for weapons - for the
protection of the investigating officer - was permissible even
if only based upon a reasonable suspicion and not probable
cause:
[T]here must be a narrowly drawn authority to permit a
reasonable search for weapons for the protection of the police
officer, where he has reason to believe that he is dealing with
an armed and dangerous individual, regardless of whether he
has probable cause to arrest the individual for a crime. 5
71. 422 U.S. at 884-85.
72. Id. at 885.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 880.
75. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
76. Id. at 27. The Court in Brignoni-Ponce at 881 used a quotation from Adams v.
Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 145-46 (1972), to justify its use of such a limited investigatory
procedure:
The Fourth Amendment does not require a policeman who lacks the precise
level of information necessary for probable cause to arrest to simply shrug his
shoulders and allow a crime to occur or a criminal to escape. On the contrary,
Terry recognizes that it may be the essence of good police work to adopt an
intermediate response. . . .A brief stop of a suspicious individual, in order to
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As a result of the Brignoni-Ponce decision, the Court seems
to have met with at least partial success the problems in en-
forcing critical immigration laws while at the same time
protecting fourth amendment guarantees. The limited stop al-
ternative in Brignoni-Ponce is not as likely to be abused as is
the "area-wide warrant" procedure in the Almeida-Sanchez
concurrence, because under the limited stop method, each fact
situation is to be judged on an individual basis. Under the area-
wide warrant procedure, only evidence of criminal activity in
a certain area is required, rather than evidence pertaining to a
particular vehicle. The limited stop method is also not threat-
ened by possible abuse that a "rubber stamped" area warrant
might be.
Furthermore, by requiring probable cause for full-scale
immigration searches and allowing for the limited stop proce-
dure, the ability and likelihood of customs officials to disguise
their searches under immigration standards is greatly reduced.
As noted earlier,7 7 it was common practice (pre-Almeida-
Sanchez) for a Border Patrol agent, acting as both a customs
and immigration official, to stop a vehicle without probable
cause, claim to be making an immigration search, and seize
any contraband discovered. While the Almeida-Sanchez deci-
sion completely cured such abuse by making the standards for
customs and immigration searches the same, the Brignoni-
Ponce decision still effectively deters such abuse because it
requires reasonable suspicion on immigration grounds.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Court's concern over roving immigration searches
should not be limited to such superficial issues as those of the
Almeida-Sanchez and Brignoni-Ponce decisions. The Court
has unfortunately become unduly burdened with such prob-
lems as the degree of probable cause necessary to effectuate a
valid immigration search, which are actually only symptoms of
a broader problem - the efficacy of the exclusionary rule in the
criminal system.
While it is not the purpose of this article to advocate an
determine his identity or to maintain the status quo momentarily while obtain-
ing more information, may be most reasonable in light of the facts known to the
officer at the time.
77. Supra, p. 860-61.
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abrogation of the exclusionary rule and suggest a substitution
of a more equitable means of deterring unlawful police
searches, there are a few proposed alternatives which should be
mentioned. Two of which the major ones are an administrative
recovery plan and the ALI Model Code of Pre-Arraignment
Procedure.
A. Administrative Recovery Plan
A plan for recovery through an administrative agency was
espoused by Chief Justice Burger in his dissent in Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics,7
where he proposed the creation of an administrative agency to
afford compensation and restitution to persons whose fourth
amendment rights have been violated. 79 The Chief Justice re-
lied upon the tort theory of respondeat superior to base such a
remedy. Through the creation of such a tribunal, private citi-
zens would have an affirmative cause of action against the
government for illegal police conduct. Such a remedy is, of
course, unavailable under the current exclusionary rule. Burger
predicted that if such a remedial scheme was adopted on the
federal level, the states would be quick to follow.80
B. ALI Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure
The ALI Code, in its section on motions to suppress evi-
dence, includes a "substantial test" as an alternative to the
exclusionary rule.8 ' The Code only allows an exclusion of evi-
dence obtained if the violation by the official is substantial or
if the exclusion is otherwise required by the state or federal
constitution.12 Certain violations are deemed substantial per
se:
78. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
79. 403 U.S. at 423. For an in-depth discussion of a similar administrative remedy,
see Horowitz, Excusing the Exclusionary Rule - Can There Be An Effective
Alternative?, 47 L.A. BAR BULL. 91 (1972). In computing money damages for illegal
searches, the author compares the computation of such an intangible loss to that of
"pain and suffering."
80. 403 U.S. at 423-24.
81. ALI MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 290.2, Determination of
Motions to Suppress Evidence.
82. Id. at § 290.2(2).
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A violation shall in all cases be deemed substantial if it was
gross, wilful and prejudicial to the accused. A violation shall
be deemed wilful regardless of the good faith of the individual
officer if it appears to be part of the practice of the law en-
forcement agency or was authorized by a high authority
within it.83
If an alleged violation is not deemed substantial per se, the
ALI Code suggests that the court consider all of the circum-
stances, including the extent to which privacy was invaded, the
extent to which the violation was willful, and whether, but for
the violation, the evidence seized would have been discovered., 4
Unless the court concludes that the illegal search meets the
"substantial test," suppression of the evidence will be denied.
The purpose behind the ALI Code's section on motions to
suppress evidence is to invite the courts to admit illegally
seized evidence when the violation is minor, not willful, and
does not reflect either agency policy or general indifference to
fourth amendment rights."5 The Chief Justice also mentioned
the "substantial test" in his dissent in Bivens. 6
These are by no means the only proposed alternatives. Vari-
ations are endless, but it seems that these two proposals repre-
sent diverse methods of effectuating a workable replacement
for the exclusionary rule. If the courts do not deem it necessary
to make such a drastic revision of the criminal justice system,
they must continue to deal with the individual problems cre-
ated by the exclusionary rule. The purpose of this article was
83. Id. at § 290.2(3).
84. Section 290.2(4) of the ALl MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE states
in full:
(4) Circumstances to Be Considered in Determining Substantiality. In de-
termining whether a violation not covered by Subsection (3) is substantial, the
court shall consider all the circumstances including:
(a) the extent of deviation from lawful conduct;
(b) the extent to which the violation was wilful;
(c) the extent to which privacy was invaded;
(d) the extent to which exclusion will tend to prevent violations of
this Code;
(e) whether, but for the violation, the things seized would have been
discovered; and
(f) the extent to which the violation prejudiced the moving party's
ability to support his motion, or to defend himself in the proceeding in
which the things seized are sought to be offered in evidence against him.
85. Vorenberg, A.L.L Approves Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure, 61
A.B.A.J. 1212, 1216 (1975).
86. 403 U.S. at 424-25.
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to illuminate one such problem - the constitutionality of rov-
ing immigration searches. Unless the Court wishes to continue
to deal with such endless dilemmas, it will have to accept a
comprehensive revamping of the exclusionary rule. The pro-
posal of the American Law Institute represents the basis of a
workable substitute.
ROBERT L. HIBBARD
